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Abstract
Caribbean countries sees little advantage in enforcing copyright laws. This article searches
for a solution to this copyright enforcement controversy. Part I of this Note provides background
information on copyright law and examines the legal, political, and socioeconomic conditions existing in both the United States and in the Caribbean countries. It also discusses the effect of these
conditions on substantive copyright laws and on the particular copyright interests and objectives
of both parties. Part II reviews different approaches to international copyright protection. Part III
discusses the advantages and disadvantages of each approach and concludes that, for resolution,
the controversy requires a new approach, tailored to the needs of both the United States and the
Caribbean. This Note concludes that a regional trade-based agreement between the U.S. and the
Caribbean countries would protect U.S. intellectual property in the region, while accommodating
the unique circumstances and interests of the Caribbean countries.

THE SEARCH FOR A SOLUTION TO
THE U.S.-CARIBBEAN COPYRIGHT
ENFORCEMENT CONTROVERSY
INTRODUCTION

Considered a major commercial asset in troubled economic times, intellectual property currently plays a prominent
role in the domestic and international economic agenda of the
United States.' As one of the world's largest producers of intellectual property, the United States has a substantial interest
in the enactment and enforcement of international copyright
laws. 2 In particular, the protection of intellectual property has
become a priority concern for the United States in relation to
Caribbean countries, where the lack of laws protecting copyrights results in a loss of millions of dollars each year for U.S.
industries. 3
As consumers of intellectual property, Caribbean countries see little advantage in enforcing copyright laws. Together
with other developing countries,4 Caribbean countries con1. EARL W. KINTNER & JACK LAHR, AN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW PRIMER 1
(2d ed. 1982) (describing intellectual property as the "products of people's mindsideas-that are translated into writings, communications, documents and tangible
things"); see JESSE DUKEMINIER &JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY 63 (2d ed. 1988). "Intel-

lectual property" refers to "productive incentives and property rights in ideas." Id. It
includes the law of patent, trademark, and copyright which grants a limited monopoly right in ideas. Id.
2. Richard A. Morford, Intellectual Property Protection: A United States Priority, 19
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 336, 336 (1989) (observing that "[t]he United States is the
largest producer of copyrighted works and the heaviest investor in basic research and
development in the world").
3. Shelley Emling, Motion Picture Exporters Seek Laws Against Cable Theft in Caribbean,J. COM., Aug. 20, 1991, at 5A. In its complaint to the U.S. International Trade
Commission, the Motion Picture Export Association of America [hereinafter
MPEAA] stated that the disregard of U.S. copyrights in eight Caribbean countries
alone costs member companies an estimated US$8,000,000 each year. Id. Particularly disturbing to U.S. industry is the fact that these same countries receive economic benefits from the United States, such as duty-free access to the U.S. market
through the Caribbean Basin Initiative. Id.; see Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery
Act (Caribbean Basin Initiative), Pub. L. No. 98-67, 97 Stat. 369, 384-87 (1983)
(codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2706 (1988)).
4. INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, WORLD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: A SURVEY BY
THE STAFF OF THE IMF 103 (1988). The International Monetary Fund's [hereinafter

IMF] list of "industrial countries" (or developed countries) include Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Italy,
Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Id. The countries categorized
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sider ready access to intellectual property a crucial means of
furthering economic development.' Consequently, the Caribbean attitude toward copyright laws is ambivalent at best.6 On
the other end of the spectrum, the United States believes that
Caribbean countries not only fail to provide adequate protection for foreign copyrights under their substantive laws, but do
not enforce the legal standards that do exist. In an era when
the United States suffers from a recession that is partially attributable to trade balance deficits, the search for a solution
remedying the international copyright situation has reached
the status of a fundamental trade issue.7
Developing countries' need for access to copyrighted
works is difficult to harmonize with the demands of producer
countries. 8 The success of a solution to the international copyright dilemma depends upon mutual gain. 9 This Note argues
that a regional trade-based agreement between the United
States and the Caribbean Basin countries' ° would provide mutual gain, and thus most effectively ensure enforcement of
copyright laws. Part I of this Note provides background information on copyright law and examines the legal, political, and
as "developing countries" for IMF purposes include any IMF members not listed
above, "together with certain essentially autonomous dependent territories for which
adequate statistics are available." Id.
5. See UNITED NATIONS EDUCATIONAL, SCIENTIFIC AND CULTURAL ORGANIZATION,
THE ABC OF COPYRIGHT (1981) [hereinafter UNESCO, COPYRIGHT] (observing im-

portance of education in curing Caribbean underdevelopment).
6. Gary M. Hoffman & George T. Marcou, Who's Stealing America's Ideas? WASH.
POST, Nov. 5, 1989, at C3. Governments of underdeveloped countries believe that
their economies and cultures will remain second-class and dependent on developed
countries if protection of intellectual property is pursued. Id.
7. Marshall A. Leaffer, Protecting United States Intellectual PropertyAbroad. Toward a
New Multilateralism, 76 IOWA L. REV. 273, 275 (1991).
8. See infra notes 37-110 (discussing in detail sources of divergence between U.S.
and Caribbean perspectives on international copyright issues).
9. See Leaffer, supra note 7, at 278 (observing that, as to developing nations and
the United States, "[a] durable agreement must be based on mutual gain and cannot
be imposed by the information-producing countries on the developing world").
10. Caribbean Basin Initiative, 9 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2706 (1988). Under 19 U.S.C.
§ 2702(b) (1983), the President may consider for designation as "beneficiary countries" the following "Caribbean Basin" countries: Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda,
the Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Costa Rica, Dominica, the Dominican Republic, El
Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Nicaragua, Panama, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, the Cayman Islands, Montserrat, Netherlands Antilles, Saint Christopher Nevis, Turks and Caicos Islands, and the British Virgin Islands. Id.
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socioeconomic conditions existing in both the United States
and in the Caribbean countries. It also discusses the effect of
these conditions on substantive copyright laws and on the particular copyright interests and objectives of both parties. Part
II reviews different approaches to international copyright protection. Part III discusses the advantages and disadvantages of
each approach and concludes that, for resolution, the controversy requires a new approach, tailored to the needs of both
the United States and the Caribbean. It proposes a regional
trade-based agreement between the United States and the Caribbean as an innovative and workable solution to the United
States-Caribbean copyright problem. This Note concludes
that a regional trade-based agreement between the U.S. and
the Caribbean countries would protect U.S. intellectual property in the region, while accommodating the unique circumstances and interests of the Caribbean countries. Because a regional trade-based agreement provides for mutual gain, it offers the best opportunity for success.
I. COPYRIGHT LAW IN THE UNITED STATES AND
THE CARIBBEAN
The United States and the Caribbean have different definitions of copyright law and different conceptions of its adequate
enforcement. The disparity arises from the contrasting legal,
political, and socioeconomic conditions existing within the
countries. These differences lead to diverging interests and
objectives in the area of international copyright law.
A. Copyright Law and Perspective in the United States
The United States is one of the world's largest producers
of copyrighted works." To preserve the income generated by
U.S. copyrighted works outside the United States, the U.S.
government has actively encouraged improved intellectual
property protection on an international scale. 12 Within U.S.
borders, the United States safeguards its intellectual property
through a long-standing tradition of copyright protection
11. Morford, supra note 2, at 336-38 (observing importance of U.S. copyright
production and heavy volume of U.S. investment in research and development).
12. Id. at 337.
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originating in the U.S. Constitution.' 3
1. U.S. Copyright Laws
Intellectual property law 14 grants rights to creators of intangible property' 5 through copyrights, trademarks,' 6 and patents.' 7 U.S. copyright law protects certain forms of intellectual
property.' 8 Essentially, a copyright is a set of exclusive rights
given to the copyright owner, for literary, musical, choreo13. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; see infra notes 25-29 and accompanying text
(discussing constitutional origins of U.S. copyright protection).
14. See generally KINTNER & LAHR, supra note I (providing overview of intellectual
property law).
15. Id. at 1 (describing intangible property and intellectual property as "products of people's minds" that are translated into tangible objects such as writings and
documents); see BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 808 (6th ed. 1990) (defining intangible asset as "[piroperty that is a 'right' such as a patent, copyright, trademark ... or one
which is lacking physical existence").
16. MICHAEL EPSTEIN, MODERN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 289 (2d ed. 1989 &
Supp. 1991) (stating that "[a] trademark is any word, name, symbol, device or any
combination thereof used by a manufacturer or retailer of a product, in connection
with that product, to help consumers identify that product as different from the products of competitors"); see Leaffer, supra note 7, at 279 n.30 (stating that "[t]rademark
law protects words, names, symbols, and devices that distinguish goods and services
from similar goods and services"). Trademark infringement occurs when a third
party uses a mark on similar goods or services, causing confusion in the consumer as
to the origin of such goods or services. Id. In the United States, trademark rights are
obtained once the mark is utilized. Id. In many other countries, trademark rights are
acquired by registering the mark. Id,
17. See EPSTEIN, supra note 16, at 199 (stating that "United States patent laws
provide a federal statutory basis for protecting certain types of inventions"); see also
Leaffer, supra note 7, at 279 n.3 1. Patent law grants property rights to useful, novel

and nonobvious products and processes. Id. It prevents third parties from using,
making or selling the patented invention for a period of seventeen years. Id. To be
patented, an invention must be new, original, and an improvement over prior inventions such that a person of ordinary skill in the area would not consider the invention
obvious. Id. A patent is much more difficult to obtain than a copyright or a trademark. Id.
18. Copyright Revision Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1976). Copyright protection is available for "original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of
expression, now known or later developed, from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or
device."

Id. To qualify for copyrightability, a work must have originality, fixation,

and the ideas contained therein must be separate from their expression. See generally
HARRY G. HENN, COPYRIGHT PRIMER (2d ed. 1979) (providing comprehensive guide
on copyright law); MELVILLE B. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT: A TREATISE ON THE
LAW OF LITERARY MUSICAL AND ARTISTIC PROPERTY, AND THE PROTECTION OF IDEAS

(14th ed. 1976);

WILLIAM S. STRONG, THE COPYRIGHT BOOK:

(1981) (providing concise overview of copyright law).

A

PRACTICAL GUIDE
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graphic, dramatic, architectural, and artistic works."9 The
rights provided to the owner under copyright law pertain to
the reproduction, adaptation, public distribution, and public
display or performance of the work in question.20
The substance and information contained within a copyrighted work is incorporeal. 2 1 That is, the author's intangible

intellectual creation may be contained in a variety of tangible
objects such as books, computer disks, music cassettes, or videotapes. The intangible nature of intellectual property presents
unique protection problems that are not as pronounced in
other forms of property, such as land and personal property.22
These protection problems arise because once a work is created and published, it is difficult to prevent others from using
and copying it. 23 Therefore, without intellectual property laws

granting protection for the creation of such works, creators
will not invest in the production of new works because third
parties will be able to appropriate those works without compensating the creators.24
As reflected in the U.S. Constitution, the ultimate purpose
of copyright law is to benefit the public by giving creators certain rights.2 5 Copyrights give authors an incentive to create,
19. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) provides that copyright protection subsists in the following subject matters of copyright: literary works, musical works, dramatic works,
pantomimes and choreographic works, pictorial, graphic and sculptural works, motion pictures and other audiovisual works, and sound recordings. Id.
20. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 107-112, 117 (1976) (stating statutory limitations on the
copyright owner's exclusive rights). In addition, there are three further limitations.
ALAN LATMAN ET AL., COPYRIGHT FOR THE NINETIES 30 (3d ed. 1989) [hereinafter
LATMAN]. First, because copyright law protects only against the copying of a copyrighted work, a copyright does not prohibit another author from independently producing the same or a similar work. Id. Second, anyone is allowed to copy the ideas
from a copyrighted work because copyright only protects the unique expression of
ideas. Id. Third, a copyright does not extend to systems explained in a work, nor to
the facts therein contained. Id.
21. LATMAN, supra note 20, at 13. One must distinguish between the intellectual
property (the copyrighted work) and the material object or copy in which the information is embodied. Id. Possession of a copy of a copyrighted work is not possession of a copyright in the intellectual property. Id. The pertinent terms are defined
in the Copyright Act of 1976. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1976).
22. Leaffer, supra note 7, at 279.
23. Id.
24. See infra notes 27-32 and accompanying text (describing concept of "incentive dissemination" which balances protection given to authors (incentive) with public's need for information (dissemination)).
25. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. This article grants to Congress the power to
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thus fostering the growth of learning and culture. 26 This idea

is called the "incentive dissemination policy" and it underlies
much of copyright law.2 7 Without such copyright protection
and laws, inventors and artists have little incentive to invent or
to create new works, as they have no guarantee that they will
reap the fruit of their labor. 28 If copyright laws, or their enforcement, prove inadequate, authors cannot compete on the
market with third-party users who reap the benefits of the stolen product without investing any of the costs in the form of
time, research, money, or creativity to produce the work.2 9
At the international level, the injuries to the owner multiply when the work is pirated, that is, exported and sold with
little if any compensation returning to the owner.3 0 A high
technology computer program, 3' for example, may be expensive to produce, but can be copied for a minimal cost. A sophisticated computer program priced in the United States at
US$500 may sell for less than US$10 in some developing
enact laws "to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings
and Discoveries." Id.
26. Id.
27. Whelan Assocs. v.Jaslow Lab., 797 F.2d 1222, 1234 (3d Cir. 1986) (observing that "[w]e must remember that the purpose of the copyright law is to create the
most efficient and productive balance between protection (incentive) and dissemination of information, to promote learning, culture, and development"); see LATMAN,
supra note 20, at 14 (stating that "[a]lthough the primary purpose of copyright law is
to foster the creation and dissemination of intellectual works for the public welfare, it
also has an important secondary purpose: to give authors the reward due them for
their contribution to society"). Id. at 14-15.
28. Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1238 (stating that "[iun balancing protection and dissemination ... the copyright law has always recognized and tried to accomodate the
fact that all intellectual pioneers build on the work of their predecessors"); see J. Davidson Frame, National Commitment to Intellectual Property Protection: An EmpiricalInvestigation, 2J. L. & TECH. 209, 210 (1987).
29. LATMAN, supra note 20, at 14; Mark L. Damschroder, Intellectual Property Rights
and the GATT: United States Goals in the Uruguay Round, 21 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 367,
370.
30. Shipman v. RKO, 100 F.2d 533, 538 (2d Cir. 1938) (stating that piracy is
inferred when similarities between the work of the plaintiff and the work of the defendant are apparent). When the defendant has had access to the plaintiffs work, the
weight given to the similarities is increased Id.; see BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY, supra
note 15, at 1148 (defining "piracy" as "illegal reprinting or reproduction of copyrighted matter ... or unlawful plagiarism of it").
31. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102(a) (1976). A computer program is categorized as a
"literary work" protected under copyright law. Id.
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Because many developing countries are signatories to international copyright conventions providing substantive international copyright law, 3 3 U.S. copyright owners face the difficulty of insufficient copyright law enforcement,3 4 rather than

the non-existence of copyright laws. 35 By refusing to enforce

the rights granted by its copyright laws, a country in effect does
not grant any rights at all.3 6
2. The Copyright Law Perspective of the United States
The United States, as a developed country3 7 ranking
among the largest producers of new and valuable information,
considers assets in the form of intellectual property a bright
spot in an otherwise bleak economic environment.3 8 The sale
and licensing of copyrighted material to other countries generates substantial income for the United States. 39 To preserve
the resulting inflow of funds and economic benefit, the U.S.
government has long been active in vigorously encouraging
improved international intellectual property protection. 40 Increasingly dependent upon the sale of information, the United
States deems the international protection of intellectual property a vital trade issue involving its competitive advantage in
32. Leaffer, supra note 7, at 280.
33. See infra text accompanying notes 111-33 (discussing international copyright
conventions and the signatories thereto).
34. Eileen Hill, The Administration is Working to Improve Worldwide Protection of One of
Our Most Valuable Assets: Intellectual Property, Bus. AM., July 21, 1986, at 9 (observing

that "[elven if adequate laws and penalties are in place, their enforcement most often
is ineffective").
35. See Morford, supra note 2, at 340 (observing that "[a] copyright has little
value if the owner has no way of enforcing its rights"); Leaffer, supra note 7, at 287
(noting that "it is inadequate enforcement rather than a lack of substantive protection" which presents dilemma for owners of copyright).
36. See Morford, supra note 2, at 340 (observing that "the best law in the world
will have little effect on ... pirates, if they know that the police never raid, the courts
never issue injunctions, or that the penalties are easily absorbed as a cost of doing
business").
37. See supra note 4 (listing those countries considered "developed").
38. See supra note I and accompanying text (maintaining that intellectual property plays prominent role in U.S. economic agenda because of its status as major
economic asset).
39. See infra notes 101-06 and accompanying text (observing that intellectual
property law benefits accrue mostly to the United States).
40. See Morford, supra note 2, at 337.
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the world market.4 '
The United States argues that inadequate protection of
copyrights has definable detrimental economic' effects.4 2 At a
time when it can hardly be afforded, the problem has resulted
in the large-scale loss of jobs in the United States. 4 3 Furthermore, the production of intellectual products has become extremely costly, requiring research, development, and largescale production expenses. 4 4 Increasingly, the United States
needs an expansive international market to recover its investment CoStS. 4 5 Unrecoverable costs, resulting from inadequate

copyright laws and enforcement, discourage production of
copyrightable material due to a loss of incentives and unavailability of funds.4 6
The United States stresses that inadequate copyright protection causes other identifiable "trade distortions. ' ' 4 7 For example, pirated products imported into the United States displace sales of legitimate items on the domestic market.48 In
addition, if products are pirated in non-U.S. markets, they decrease United States exports to those markets. 4 9 Furthermore,
pirated parts exported from those non-U.S. markets to third
41. Leafier, supra note 7, at 275. Reflecting this view, former U.S. Trade Representative [hereinafter USTR] Carla Hills has stated that any trade agreement signed
with Central America must contain "guarantees that investors' and traders' intellectual property will be protected." See Emling, supra note 3, at A5.
42. INT'L TRADE COM., FOREIGN PROTECTION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ITS
EFFECT ON U.S. INDUSTRY AND TRADE (1988).

The U.S. International Trade Commis-

sion [hereinafter ITC] estimates that the failure of international copyright laws results in a loss of $US24,000,000,000 for U.S. businesses. /d; see "U.S. Firms Lose
Billions Annually to Foreign Piracy, ITC Intellectual Property Study Finds," 5 Int'l
Trade Rep. (BNA) 290 (Mar. 2, 1988) (claiming losses are $US43,000,000,000 to
$US60,000,000,000 per year due to non-U.S. piracy of intellectual property). Id.
43. Calvin Sims, Wounded by Patent Piracy ... Vexed by Tape Technology; U.S. Laws
Offer Less Protection Than Those of Major Trading Partners, N.Y. TIMES, May 13, 1987, at

DI (reporting that 130,000 jobs are lost each year due to non-U.S. piracy). One ITC
report has estimated that 131,000jobs in five industry sectors were lost in 1982 due
to foreign counterfeiting. United States Int'l Trade Comm. Pub. No. 1479, XVII
"Effects of Foreign Product Counterfeiting on U.S. Industry," 4-13 (Jan. 1984).
44. Leafier, supra note 7, at 275.
45. Id.

46. See supra notes 21-24 and accompanying text (explaining scenario unique to
copyright holders whose work is intangible, easily copied, and requires protection as
part of incentive to produce).
47. Emery Simon, U.S. Trade Policy and Intellectual Property Rights, 50 ALB. L. REV.

501, 501 (1986).
48. Id.; see supra note 30 and accompanying text (defining "piracy").
49. Simon, supra note 47, at 501.
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countries again displace United States exports.5 ° In contrast
with the view of Caribbean countries, the United States argues
that lack of enforcement is equivalent to a trade barrier because inadequate enforcement deters international trade.5
The United States therefore finds itself in very different
circumstances than do the countries of the Caribbean. 2 These
contrasting circumstances have led to differing interests and
objectives in the search for a workable solution to the problem.5" The United States' strict adherence to strong substantive copyright laws reflects its legal tradition of protecting
copyrightable material. 54 Furthermore, the economic-based
need for copyright compensation from non-U.S. countries
spurs the United States to push relentlessly for an overhaul of
the international protection of copyrights.5 5 The United States
perceives the international copyright protection problem as a
major trade issue. 56 Recent approaches to solve the problem
have been trade-based, with the United States holding trade
pacts hostage to its demands for better copyright protection. 7
B. The Copyright Law and Perspective of Caribbean Countries
The countries of the Caribbean 58 face monumental eco50. Id.
51. Id. at 501-02; see infra notes 108-10 and accompanying text (providing Caribbean opinion that intellectual property protection is what qualifies as international
trade barrier).
52. William Alonzo Stanback, InternationalIntellectual Property Protection: An Integrated Solution to the Inadequate ProtectionProblem, 29 VA.J. INT'L L. 517, 525-41 (1989)
(discussing differing U.S. and Caribbean positions on copyright law and enforcement).
53. Id.
54. See supra notes 14-36 and accompanying text (providing an overview of copyright law with focus on U.S. law).
55. Emling, supra note 3, at 5A (quoting former USTR Director of Caribbean
Basin Affairs John Melle as stating that "[i]ncreasingly the U.S. can[not] tolerate the
lack of protection around the world").
56. Leaffer, supra note 7, at 277.
57. Mary Foley, U.S. and Poland Co-Star in Copyright Dispute, J.CoM., Sept. 24,
1991, at 6 (discussing U.S. approach to copyright disagreements); see infra text accompanying notes 134-40 (discussing recent attempts by the United States to condition the progress of trade agreement negotiations upon better protection of intellectual property).
58. See supra note 10 (listing countries classified as "Caribbean Basin" countries
by Caribbean Basin Initiative); see Treaty Establishing the Caribbean Community,
946 U.N.T.S. 17 (July 4, 1973) [hereinafter CARICOM] (listing Anguilla, Antigua
and Barbuda, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, Montserrat,
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nomic, political, and cultural development problems similar to
those faced by other developing countries.5 9 Improvement of
the current substandard living conditions greatly depends on
the progress of education, science, and culture. 60 Access to
the intellectual property of developed countries is vital to the
creation and maintenance of an effective system of education. 6 '
Education, in turn, is essential for the training of qualified
workers, technicians, engineers, and professionals crucial to
the countries' advancement.6 2 In an attempt to improve their
situation, Caribbean countries have reached a regional agreement, the Treaty Establishing the Caribbean Community
("CARICOM"), which has social, cultural, and technological
development as its goal. 6 3

1. Caribbean Copyright Laws
The ideas and concepts underlying Caribbean copyright
legislation are similar to those found in U.S. law, and have resulted in laws comparable to U.S. copyright laws. 64 Haiti's
copyright statute, for example, covers "literary and artistic
works" which includes books, leaflets, writings, dramatic
works, musical compositions and paintings.6 5 The authors of
St. Kitts-Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, and Trinidad and Tobago
as signatories to CARICOM).
59. See CARICOM, supra note 58, art. 3, 946 U.N.T.S. at 19. Article 3 of CARICOM classifies Barbados, Guyana, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago as the more
developed Caribbean countries; less developed countries are Antigua, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Montserrat, St. Kitts-Nevis, Anguilla, St. Lucia, and St. Vincent. Id.
60. See UNESCO, COPYRIGHT, supra note 5, at 67 (observing the importance of
education in curing Caribbean subdevelopment).
61. Id.
62. See MARK M. BOGUSLAVSKY, COPYRIGHT IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 38
(1979); see also UNESCO, COPYRIGHT, supra note 5, at 68; JORGE HEINE & LESLIE F.
MANIGAT, THE CARIBBEAN AND WORLD POLITICS 29 (1988) (noting Caribbean's economic dependence on non-Caribbean technology).
63. CARICOM, supra note 58, pmbl., 946 U.N.T.S. at 18.

64. See generally UNITED NATIONS EDUCATIONAL, SCIENTIFIC AND CULTURAL ORGANIZATION, COPYRIGHT LAWS AND TREATIES OF THE WORLD (1971) [hereinafter
UNESCO, LAWS AND TREATIES] (compiling copyright laws and treaties of numerous
nations).
65. See id., "Haiti," at I (outlining Haiti's statutes covering intellectual property
law in general and addressing protection and enforcement of copyrightable material); Law on Literary and Artistic Property, 1885, art. 1 (Haiti). Other protected
works are engravings, lithographs, geographical maps, plans, scientific sketches, and
any literary, scientific or artistic work capable of publication by any method of printing or reproduction. Id.
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these works are granted property rights in their works and the
privilege of instituting proceedings against infringers. 66 Haiti's Penal Code makes the violation of the copyright laws a
criminal infringement and outlines the fines payable in the
event of infringement. 67
Nicaragua's copyright laws are found primarily in Articles
724-867 of the Nicaraguan Civil Code. 68 The Nicaraguan Civil

Code divides the subject matter of copyright protection into
separate articles relating to dramatic works and general artistic
works. 69 The rules relating to infringement are found in the
Civil Code as well.7° Infringement is deemed to have occured
when someone uses an original work without the consent of
the legitimate owner. 7 1 The penalties for copyright infringement include forfeiture of all remaining copies of the work and
payment of compensation to the lawful owner of the work for
the value of the infringing copies.72 In addition, the Civil Code
provides that copyright infringers are also punishable under
the Penal Code for the commission of a fraudulent act.73
The Dominican Republic protects scientific, artistic, and
66. See UNESCO, LAWS AND TREATIES, "Haiti," supra note 64, at 1 (outlining
Haiti's 1885 statute covering copyrightable materials); Law on Literary and Artistic
Property, 1885, art. 2 (Haiti). The author is required to deposit five copies of the
work with the Secretariat of State for Home Affairs. Id.
67. See UNESCO, LAws AND TREATIES, "Haiti," supra note 64, at 2 (covering
relevant Haitian criminal law provisions applying to copyright infringement); Penal
Code of 1835, arts. 347-51 (Haiti). Proceeds from confiscated infringing materials
are handed over to the copyright owner to compensate him for his suffering. Id.
68. See UNESCO, LAws AND TREATIES, "Nicaragua," supra note 64, at 1 (outling
statutory provisions relating to intellectual property and copyright law in Nicaragua);
Civil Code, 1904, arts. 724-867 (Nicar.).
69. See UNESCO, LAws AND TREATIES, "Nicaragua," supra note 64, at 3-5; Civil
Code, 1904, arts. 765-88, 789-98 (Nicar.). The author of a dramatic work enjoys his
rights during his lifetime. Id. Upon the author's death, the rights pass to the author's heirs for a period of 30 years. Id. The same rule applies to artistic works in
general, except that no time period is specified for duration of the heirs' rights. Id.
70. Id.
71. See UNESCO, LAws AND TREATIES, "Nicaragua," supra note 64, at 5; Civil

Code, 1904, art. 799 (Nicar.). Examples of use of a work without the consent of the
legitimate owner include publishing original works, speeches, lessons and articles,
publishing translations, performing dramatic or musical works, omitting the name of
the author, and reproducing an architectural work. Id.
72. See UNESCO, LAws AND TREATIES, "Nicaragua," supra note 64, at 6; Civil
Code, 1904, art. 806 (Nicar.); see also arts. 806-30 (covering penalties for infringement). Id.
73. See UNESCO, LAws AND TREATIES, "Nicaragua," supra note 64, at 7; Civil
Code, 1904, art. 830 (Nicar.).
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literary productions of any kind. 74 A copyright belongs to the

author during the author's lifetime, and to the author's heirs
for thirty years after the author's death. 75 Any person who illegally exercises any of the rights reserved to the author by the
Dominican copyright laws is guilty of a misdemeanor, entitling
the author to bring suit for damages or for an injunction.7 6 In
order to benefit from the protection of the Dominican copyright laws, however, the author is required to register the copy-7
7
right with the Copyright Registry of the Dominican Republic.
2. Copyright Law Perspective of Caribbean Countries
Caribbean countries have an unenthusiastic attitude toward their own laws as well as toward international copyright
laws. 78 Their attitude is due in part to their perception that
copyright law limits free access to intellectual property, thus
hindering economic development.7 9
Despite their ambivalence regarding copyright law, a significant number of Caribbean countries are signatories to international copyright conventions. 80 As a consequence of their
ratification of such conventions, these countries are bound, as
a matter of international law, to adhere to the international
copyright laws and standards embraced in such treaties. 8 '
74. See UNESCO, LAwS AND TREATIES, "Dominican Republic," supra note 64, at
1; Copyright Statute, 1947, art. 3, (Dom. Rep.). Article 3 includes a list of works
protected by the Copyright Statute, such as theatrical works, cinematographic works
and radio plays. Id.
75. See id. art. 30, at 6.
76. See id. art. 9, at 2. Where the work is capable of misleading the public as to
its identity, the author is entitled to bring an action. Id. art. 10, at 2.
77. See id. art. 11, at 2.
78. Hill, supra note 34, at 9 (observing the inadequacy of copyright law enforcement).
79. The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development [hereinafter
UNCTAD] reflects in its position papers the concerns of developing countries in obtaining access to the works of developed countries. See generally John P. Spitals, The
UNCTAD Report on the Role of Trademarks in Developing Countries: An Analysis, 2 N.Y.L.
SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 369 (1981); see also Carlos A. Primo Braga, The Economics of
Intellectual Property Rights and the GATT: A View from the South, 22 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L
L. 243 (1989) [hereinafter Primo Braga].
80. See infra text accompanying notes 111-33, discussing international copyright
conventions.
81. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, adopted May 22, 1969; opened
for signature May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter Vienna Convention]. Article 26 of the Vienna Convention concerns a paramount principle of international
law, pacta sunt servanda, which holds that "every treaty in force is binding upon the
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Therefore, the inadequate protection of intellectual property
in the Caribbean is more closely attributable to nonexistent or
ineffectual enforcement of the law than to a total lack of substantive copyright laws.8 2
A major enforcement effort would be necessary to adequately protect foreign copyrighted material in the Caribbean.83 Achieving sufficient enforcement of copyright laws demands complex and very costly administrative and judicial systems. 4 The infrastructure required to support such systems is
severely lacking in Caribbean Basin countries.8 5 Basic services,
as well as skilled workers, technicians, and administrative personnel, are either scarce or completely lacking. 6 Further infrastructure problems include substandard communications facilities, airports, roads, and other means of transportation. 7
The problem is compounded by the notoriously slow bureaucracies of many Caribbean countries.8 8
The public, of course, would bear the cost of developing
parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith." Id. art. 26, 1155
U.N.T.S. at 339.
82. UNESCO, COPYRIGHT, supra note 5, at 68. The enactment of copyright laws
does not lead directly to protection of copyrighted material. Id. In addition to implementation of the laws, public education is also necessary to explain rights and
liabilities to those affected by such laws. Id.
83. Hoffman & Marcou, supra note 6. Traditional civil suits are largely ineffective as a means of enforcing intellectual property rights. Id. Government computer
networks are greatly decentralized and virtually impossible to monitor. Id. Many
holders of intellectual property rights have no way of knowing when their rights are
infringed. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. See Mark B. Baker &Jaime E. Toro-Monserrate, CBI v. Caricom: The Interplay
Between Two InternationalLaw Instruments, 11 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 1, 5 (1986)
(arguing in addition that there are major disparities in level of infrastructure needs
among Caribbean nations).
87. Id.; see Anilisa G. Lunger, The Caribbean Basin Initiative and the I.R.C. Section
936 Investment Program: A United States Answer to the Troubled CaribbeanRegion, 9 U. PA.
J. INT'L Bus. L. 741, 764 (1987) (noting that Caribbean infrastructure problem has
turned into vicious cycle: lack of infrastructure discourages foreign investment, and
resulting lack of investment prevents development of infrastructure). Many of the
poorer nations lack the infrastructure needed for even small scale industry. Id. at
765. Dominica, one of the smaller Caribbean islands, has an airport which cannot
handle jet aircraft, and its technological capacities are not sufficiently advanced to
harness water for industrial use. Id. In most, if not all, Caribbean nations, frequent
electricity shutdowns and water shortages are common. Id.
88. Thomas L. Raleigh III, The U.S. Caribbean Basin Initiative, 3 INT'L Bus. LAw.
136, 137 (1987).
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the judicial and administrative infrastructures necessary for
copyright law enforcement. 8 9 Developing countries in general
are reluctant to allocate scant government capital to the enforcement of intellectual property laws. 90 In the Caribbean, a
severe shortage of foreign currency, coupled, with the belief
that available resources are better spent elsewhere, renders the
9
enforcement of foreign copyright laws a secondary concern. 1
Many view piracy as having the benefit of producing desperately needed intellectual property at little cost to the public
and with less sacrifice of the funds demanded for the development of infrastructure.92
The inability or mere unwillingness of government and judicial officials to enforce copyright laws may also stem from
political instability and widespread corruption. 93 Enforcement
efforts are thwarted when enforcement officers can be bribed
to allow incidents of infringement to escape the sanctions provided for by the law. 94 The natives of Saint Vincent and the
Grenadines, for example, have grown cynical and alienate
themselves from their own political process.9 5 Vincentians
perceive political elections simply as a change from a few individuals to a few individuals within the same corrupt system. 96
89. See Stanback, supra note 52, at 536 ("[B]ecause most developed countries
already have extensive systems of enforcement, the cost of implementing a new international regime would be minimal ....

However, the cost .

.

. will likely be much

higher for developing countries.").
90. See Leaffer, supra note 7, at 282.
91. Hill, supra note 34, at 9 (observing that at root of enforcement problem is
"the belief in many developing . . . countries that economic development will be
hindered ...

if counterfeiting is curbed").

92. Id. (noting that "the theft of foreign intellectual property is at the root of
national industrial policies designed to provide a 'shortcut' to modernization").
93. See generally ANDRES SERBIN, CARIBBEAN GEOPOLITICS: TOWARD SECURITY

(1990) (providing overall review of principal political and socioeconomic features of Caribbean); see also THOMAS D. ANDERSON, GEOPOLITICS OF THE
CARIBBEAN: MINISTATES IN A WIDER WORLD (1984) (studying geopolitics of Caribbean, detailing natural and economic background of problems of Caribbean Basin);
THROUGH PEACE?

Paul Verna, RIAA: Paraguay, El Salvador Menace Copyright Owners, BILLBOARD, May 9,

1992, at 8. In Paraguay, for example, there are fairly adequate laws protecting intellectual property, but because of the complete indifference of government officials,
pirates operate openly. Id.
94. Verna, supra note 93 (observing that copyright pirates are allowed to operate
openly).
95. CATHY SUNSHINE, THE CARIBBEAN: SURVIVAL, STRUGGLE AND SOVEREIGNTY
138 (1985) (discussing Caribbean economic and political situation).
96. Id.
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In addition, Caribbean countries simply have no tradition
of protecting intellectual property. 97 The lack of tradition contrasts with the United States, where copyright law is so ingrained in U.S. jurisprudence as to be included in the Constitution. 9 Unlike the United States, Caribbean countries have
few authors, inventors, or companies that would lobby for, or
benefit from, sound intellectual property laws. 99 Therefore,
U.S. outrage as to "mere" copyright violations are sometimes
met if not with bafflement, then at least without complete understanding.' 00
C. Sources of CaribbeanDivergence with the United States
A conflict in interests and goals has arisen between the
United States and the Caribbean countries. The United States
increasingly relies on the sale and licensing of creative works as
a valuable asset in its trade with other countries. As a result,
the United States has become greatly concerned with protecting intellectual property on an international scale.' 0 ' The U.S.
view of ideal copyright protection, however, collides with the
interests of the Caribbean countries.
Vigorous urging and encouragement by the United States
for improvement of copyright law enforcement, ostensibly for
the benefit of both sides, has a self-interested flavor to it.'" 2
Stronger intellectual property rights protection would probably not aid the deficient economies in the Caribbean, and instead, would mostly benefit multinational corporations likely
to be based in the United States. 0 3 The benefits run to the
97. See generally UNESCO, LAWS AND TREATIES, supra note 64 (outlining statutory, as opposed to constitutional, basis for copyright law in Caribbean countries).
98. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl.8; see supra note 25 and accompanying text (discussing constitutional basis for U.S. copyright laws).
99. Leaffer, supra note 7, at 282.
100. See Primo Braga, supra note 79, at 253 (observing that "any attempt to present a country's intellectual property system as a model of 'enlightened' virtues is
bound to face a great deal [of] skepticism in the Third World").

101. Leafier, supra note 7, at 287.
102. Id. at 283 (stating that perception of U.S. motives as self-interested is true
"especially when developing countries have to pay the bill for protecting the rights of
foreigners and the expense of the indigenous population").
103. Primo Braga, supra note 79, at 252. An improvement of intellectual property protection to favor foreign parties would be highly controversial in developing
countries. Id. In his study of the costs and benefits of strong intellectual property
protection in the developing countries, Mr. Primo Braga concludes that "[t]he impact
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United States rather than to the Caribbean due to the simple
reality that Caribbean countries typically do not have a myriad
of intellectual property creators and owners who would stand
to benefit from the international protection of copyright

laws. '

04

If international copyright laws were enforced in the Caribbean, any benefits to Caribbean countries resulting from exporting their intellectual property would be greatly out-

weighed by the cost of importing and paying licensing fees for
foreign technology.' 0 5 Due to the high price of royalties paid
to their authors, developed countries receive billions of dollars
in foreign exchange from information-poor developing coun-

tries for the sale of intellectual property. 0 6 Furthermore,
some developing countries believe that the developed world
seeks not only to make money, but also to control the developing world's access to technology, thus ultimately managing
07
their progress.
Caribbean countries disagree with the United States as to
the nature and cause of the international copyright problem.
There is opposition to the U.S. view that the problem qualifies
as a trade issue with definite economic effects.' 0 8 Developing
of any individual intellectual property reform in the Third World would be marginal
at best." Id.at 257.
104. Stanback, supra note 52, at 535 (observing that "[b]ecause these countries
have less intellectual property and technology to export, most of the benefits from
proposed protection will bypass them").
105. Stanback, supra note 52, at 535.
106. Leaffer, supra note 7, at 281. A country's economy is affected by the
number of copyright holders who receive royalties from foreigners who pay to use
the information protected by international copyright laws. Id. Countries with many
creators who sell and license their intellectual property abroad have a substantial
capital income flowing from foreign licensing payments. Developing countries, with
a substantially lower number of nationals who sell and license their copyrighted
materials abroad, end up with a net outflow of scarce capital to developed nations
when they comply with international copyright laws. Stanback, supra note 52, at 534
n.84.
107. Stanback, supra note 52, at 533; see Other Nations Said Set to Attack U.S. Over
Trade Sanctions at GATT Meeting, 6 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 171 (Feb. 8, 1989) (stating
that "two days of talks on the intellectual property issue ended Feb. 7 in yet another
stalemate .... Developing countries are afraid that Western countries led by the
European Community and the United States, are seeking to impose their own rules in
the area, effectively blocking Third World development in such fields as patents and
copyrights").
108. See Stanback, supra note 52, at 525; see supra text accompanying notes 37-57
(discussing United States position on the problem of international copyright law).
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countries generally deny that the international copyright situation qualifies as a trade problem, and if it does, they argue that
intellectual property protection actually creates a barrier to international trade. 10 9 In seeking a workable solution to the international copyright problem, Caribbean countries therefore
approach the problem from a very different perspective than
does the United States. 10
II. APPROACHES TO INTERNATIONAL
COPYRIGHT PROTECTION
Copyright owners have looked to various international law
approaches to protect their creations. Such approaches include multilateral copyright conventions, bilateral agreements,
and multinational trade-based agreements. Each approach has
marked advantages and disadvantages, with differing levels of
effectiveness.
A. Multilateral Copyright Treaties
1. The Berne Convention
The first multilateral treaty concerning international copyright law was signed in 1886 in Berne, Switzerland.' " The resulting Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and
Artistic Works 12 (the "Berne Convention") is administered by
the World Intellectual Property Organization (the "WIPO"), a
specialized agency of the United Nations." 3 To date, the
Berne Convention has eighty-four signatories, including Caribbean nations. 1 4 The United States was the last major West109. Bryan T. Johnson, A U.S. Strategy for GATT, 804 HERITAGE FOUNDATION
REP. 84 (1991).
110. Stanback, supra note 52, at 525 (discussing differing perspectives of United
States and Caribbean).
111. See generally MARSHALL A. LEAFFER, INTERNATIONAL TREATIES ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (1990) [hereinafter LEAFFER, TREATIES] (containing text of major

treaties on intellectual property, with commentary); see also Damschroder, supra note
29, at 378.
112. June 26, 1948, 331 U.N.T.S. 217, Paris revision, July 24, 1971 [hereinafter

Berne Convention].
113. See generally DouGLAs WILLIAMS, THE SPECIALIZED AGENCIES AND THE
UNITED NATIONS: THE SYSTEM IN CRISIS (1990). The WIPO seeks to promote the
protection of international intellectual property rights. Leaffer, supra note 7, at 29293; see also UNESCO, COPYRIGHT, supra note 5, at 65 (providing overview of Berne
Convention provisions).
114. BoGusLAVSKY, supra note 62, at 55-64. The original document was signed
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ern country to ratify the Berne Convention, effective on March

1, 1989.1"1
The objective of the Berne Convention, as set out in its
preamble, is to bring the nations of the world together in a
venture to protect, in as an effective and uniform a manner as
possible, the rights of authors in their literary and artistic
works." 6 Its fundamental principle is protection based upon
national treatment, which ensures that foreign works enjoy, in
each member country, the same advantages accorded to the
works of that member country's nationals." 7 In addition,
copyright protection extends to authors of non-member as
well as member countries, on the condition that the work is
l
published for the first time in a member country.' 8
The Berne Convention also addresses standards to be observed for the protection of international copyrights."'
The
Berne Convention contains specific provisions detailing the
minimum levels of protection that all member countries must
provide. 20 Furthermore, the Berne Convention states that it
is not necessary for member countries to abide by specific forby Britain, Belgium, Haiti, Germany, Spain, Italy, Liberia, Tunisia, France, and Switzerland. Id. at 55. Since 1886, the Berne Convention has been revised in 1908,
1928, 1948, 1967, and 1971. See generally Eric A. Savage, Abandon Restrictions All Ye
Who Enter Here!: The New United States Copyright Law and the Berne Convention, 9 N.Y.U.
J. INT'L L. & POL. 457 (1977).
115. Cary H. Sherman & David E. Korn, Overview of Major Principles in International Intellectual Property Law, 20 (1991) (unpublished article available from Arnold & Porter, Washington, D.C.); see Damschroder, supra note 29, at 379. U.S. ratification occurred very late, despite efforts of legislators to bring U.S. laws into line
with the Berne Convention so that ratification by the United States would be permitted. Id. This situation occurred because domestic lobbyists long succeeded in preserving the formalities contained in U.S. copyright law, which precluded U.S. participation. Id.
116. Berne Convention, supra note 112, pmbl., 331 U.N.T.S. at 219.
117. Id. art. 4(1), 331 U.N.T.S. at 223; see Marian N. Leich, Contemporary Practice
of the United States Relating to InternationalLaw, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 63, 64-65 (1989);
Damschroder, supra note 29, at 379 (discussing national treatment).
118. Berne Convention, supra note 112, art. 5, 331 U.N.T.S. at 225.
119. Leich, supra note 117, at 65;see BoGusLAVSKY, supra note 62, at 26 (discussing national treatment and minimum protection clauses).
120. Berne Convention, supra note 112, 331 U.N.T.S. 217; see UNESCO, CopyRIGHT, supra note 5, at 66. The Berne Convention provides minimum conditions of
protection for rights of reproduction, translation, public performance, recitation,
broadcasting, cinematography, adaptation, and recording of musical works. Berne
Convention, supra note 112, 331 U.N.T.S. 217. The author has a moral right to object to the mutilation, distortion, or other alterations to his work that would be detrimental to his reputation. Id.
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malities, such as registration required by a particular member
country of its own citizens, in order to qualify for copyright
2
protection. ' '

2. The Universal Copyright Convention
The Universal Copyright Convention 122 (the "UCC") is a
multilateral treaty that was ratified, not as a replacement for
previously existing treaties, but to establish a basis for copyright protection among countries of widely differing cultural
traditions and conflicting interests. 2 3 The United States is a
signatory to the UCC.1 24 The member Caribbean countries in-

clude the Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Cuba, the Dominican
25

Republic, and Haiti.'

Adopted in 1952, the UCC, like the Berne Convention,
embraces national treatment as its essential feature.' 26 Works
created by a national of a UCC nation or works published in a
UCC nation are eligible for national treatment.' 27 Each mem121. See UNESCO, COPYRIGHT, supra note 5, at 66 (discussing Berne Convention
formalities required for copyright protection). In the United States, for example, a
person wishing to sue on copyright infringment must first register with the U.S.
Copyright Office. See 17 U.S.C. § 411 (a). Registration, however, is not required in
many other countries for commencement of a suit. UNESCO, COPYRIGHT, supra note
5, at 66.
122. Universal Copyright Convention, Sept. 6, 1952, 6 U.S.T. 2731, 216
U.N.T.S. 132, Paris revision, July 24, 1971, 25 U.S.T. 1341, 943 U.N.T.S. 178 [hereinafter UCC]; see LEAFFER, TREATIES, supra note 111 (discussing major intellectual
property treaties).
123. UCC, supra note 122, pmbl., 25 U.S.T. at 1341, 943 U.N.T.S. at 194;
UNESCO, COPYRIGHT, supra note 5, at 64. The UCC is administered by UNESCO, a
U.N. organization of which the United States is no longer a member. Leaffer, supra
note 7, at 293 n.95.
124. Leaffer, supra note 7, at 293 n.95 (describing reason for U.S. adherence to
UCC).
125. International Copyright Relations of the United States, TREATIES IN FORCE: A
LIST OF TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES IN

FORCE, Jan. 1, 1992, at 409-22.
126. UCC, supra note 122, art. II, 25 U.S.T. at 1343, 943 U.N.T.S. at 195; see
LATMAN, supra note 20, at 792 (citing article Il of the UCC); see supra notes 111-21 and
accompanying text (discussing Berne Convention and principle of national treatment); see also Hans P. Kunz-Hallstein, The United States Proposalfor a GATT Agreement
on Intellectual Property and the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, 22
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 265, 274 (1989) (observing that "[t]he principle of national
treatment is .. .a cornerstone of the present intellectual property treaties").
127. UCC, supra note 122, art. II, 25 U.S.T. at 1343, 943 U.N.T.S. at 195;
LATMAN, supra note 20, at 793 (stating that "[t]he UCC allows member countries to
impose compliance with formalities, but somewhat simplifies their array. Under UCC
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ber nation must therefore give the same treatment to the nationals of other member nations as it gives to its own nation28
als. 1
Many consider the UCC to have lower standards than the
Berne Convention, thus providing for a lesser level of protection for member copyright owners.' 29 In contrast to the Berne
Convention, the UCC does not endeavor to set out specific
minimum standards of copyright protection, beyond the general requirement that member states provide
"adequate and
15 0
effective" protection for copyright owners.
The UCC may provide for lower protection standards because it was intended, from its inception, to provide a system
acceptable to developing countries and to those not yet a part
of the international copyright system, such as the United
States.'' Another explanation for the lower UCC copyright
protection standards resulted from the UCC's Paris revision of
1971, through which developing nations received more latitude as to protection and enforcement of foreign copyrights.'5 2 To qualify as providing "adequate" protection, how-

ever, member nations are obligated to grant certain basic
art. III, all of a member country's conditions on the initial existence of copyright shall
be deemed satisfied if the foreign work was first and continuously published with an
accompanying notice"). Notice entails including the copyright symbol accompanied
by the name of the copyright owner and the year of first publication, placed in such a
manner and location as to give reasonable notice of the claim of copyright. UCC,
supra note 122, art. III, 1,25 U.S.T. at 1345, 943 U.N.T.S. at 195.
128. LATMAN, supra note 20, at 792 (describing concept of national treatment).
129. See UNESCO, COPYRIGHT, supra note 5, at 64; BOGUStAVSKv, supra note 62,
at 26; see also Damschroder, supra note 29, at 381-82 (stating that "[e]ven within the
UCC itself the supremacy of the Berne Convention was never in doubt"). Under
Berne Convention provisions, member nations are prohibited from denouncing the
Berne Convention in favor of the UCC. Id. at 382. Where a dispute arises between
nationals of Berne Convention members, the Berne Convention is applied. Id.; see
Leich, supra note 117, at 65; Leaffer, supra note 7, at 276.
130. UCC, supra note 122, art. 1,25 U.S.T. at 1341, 943 U.N.T.S. at 195. Article
I of the UCC states that "[e]ach Contracting State undertakes to provide for the adequate and effective protection of the rights of authors and other copyright proprietors." Id. at 197. After the 1971 Paris revision, the rights became somewhat more
explicit, as seen in article IV, which includes the exclusive rights of reproduction,
public performance and broadcasting. Id. art. IV; see Damschroder, supra note 29, at
382 (discussing adequate protection of authors and copyright holders); see also
UNESCO, COPYRIGHT, supra note 5, at 65. The only truly detailed UCC provision
relating to minimum standards of protection relates to the right of translation because of its importance to the world community. Id.
131. UNESCO, COPYRIGHT, supra note 5, at 64.
132. Id. at 70 (discussing 1971 Paris revisions to UCC and Berne Convention,

1992-19931

U.S.-CARIBBEAN COPYRIGHTS

rights, such as. the reproduction right. 13 3
B. Bilateral Trade-Based Copyright Approaches
U.S. business stands at the forefront of the movement in
favor of the bilateral trade-based approach to the dilemma of
international copyright protection.' 3 ' The bilateral approach
requires agreement on copyright matters between two particular nations, through direct negotiations.'"3 Economic sanctions provide the "teeth" of the agreements, and are applied
by the United States toward noncomplying nations.' 3 6 The
United States has domestically confirmed the legality of imposing unilateral trade sanctions through the Omnibus Trade and
Competitiveness Act of 1988 (the "OTCA"). 3 7 The OTCA

proclaims the protection of intellectual property rights a priority of U.S. trade policy.' 3 8 The OTCA authorizes the government to use economic sanctions139 as leverage against countries it believes do not afford adequate protection to its copy40
rights.
together with analysis of measurement and degree of copyright protection afforded
by revisions).
133. Id. at 65 (stating that "[t]he rights were made more explicit in 1971 in Article IV [I to include the exclusive rights of reproduction"); see Copyright Act of 1976,
17 U.S.C. § 106 (1976) (granting owner of copyright right to reproduce copyrighted
work in copies or phonorecords); see also BOGUSLAVSKY, supra note 62, at 26 (observing that UCC provides low minimum standards of protection).
134. See Emling, supra note 3. The MPEAA, for example, has asked that the
bilateral trade-based approach be used to limit or deny Caribbean Basin Initiative
benefits to Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras,
Jamaica, Nicaragua, and Panama. Id.; see Max Baucus, A New Trade Strategy: The Case
For BilateralAgreements, 22 CORNELL INr'L L. J. 1 (1989) (discussing bilateral agreements).
135. See Leaffer, supra note 7, at 295 (describing the bilateral approach to copyright protection, and stating that "[b]ilateral trade agreements have long been a
mainstay of U.S. policy. Over the years, the United States has entered into a series of
bilateral agreements on patent and copyright law").
136. See Leaffer, supra note 7,at 295-97 (discussing bilateral trade-based approach).
137. 96 Pub. L.No. 100-418, §§ 1301-1480, 102 Stat. 1107, 1164-84, 1211-16
(codified at 19 U.S.C. §§ 1337, 2242, 2411-2420 (1988)).
138. Id.
139. 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (c)(1988). Economic sanctions include tariff increases or
the removal of tariff preferences. Id.
140. See Leaffer, supra note 7 at 295-96. The increased function of the USTR as
to negotiating intellectual property protection includes the USTR's responsibility annually to assess the adequacy of such protection granted by those countries in bilateral trade agreements with the United States. Id.; see 19 U.S.C. §§ 2241(a)(1)(A)(i),
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Caribbean countries experienced the United States' bilateral trade-based approach first through the Caribbean Basin
Initiative (the "Initiative"). 4 ' The Initiative, signed into law in
1983 and extended indefinitely in 1990,142 involved a series of
agreements between the United States and individual countries of the region that met specific economic, ideological, and
political criteria. 4 3 The United States designed the Initiative
to allow these "qualified" Caribbean nations to trade on more
favorable terms with the United States through the use of benefits in the form of economic aid, trade, and private investment.' 4 4 Only those countries designated as "beneficiary
countries" by the U.S. President may reap the benefits from
45
the Initiative.1
The Initiative seeks, inter alia, to ensure the protection of
intellectual property rights of U.S. citizens vis-A-vis Caribbean
nations through two main provisions. First, the U.S. President
2241(b), 2414(a)(1) (1988). The USTR is also required to identify and designate as
priority countries "those foreign countries that: (A) deny adequate and effective protection of intellectual property rights, or (B) deny fair and equitable market access to
United States persons that rely upon intellectual property protection." Id.
§ 2242(a)(1), § 2242(a)(2) (1988). Once such "priority countries" are identified,
sanctions may be imposed if progress cannot be made otherwise. Id. § 2411 (1988).
141. 19 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2706 (1988); see generally Francis W. Foote, The Caribbean
Basin Initiative: Development, Implementation and Application of the Rules of Origin and RelatedAspects of Duty-Free Treatment, 19 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 245 (1985) (pro-

viding detailed analysis of Caribbean Basin Initiative provisions and development);
see also ANDERSON, supra note 93, at 148 (discussing Caribbean Basin Initiative); Re-

marks Announcing the Enterprise for the Americas Initiative, 26 WEEKLY COMP.
PRES. Doc. 1009, 1011 (June 27, 1990) [hereinafter EAI] (outlining President Bush's
plan designed to improve economic situation of Caribbean and Latin American countries through expanded trade with United States).
142. Statement of former USTR Carla Hills at Hearing of the Trade Subcommittee of the House Ways and Means Committee, Federal News Service (July 25,
1991) [hereinafter Hills], available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, CURRNT File.
143. 19 U.S.C. § 2702(b) (1988). The countries eligible for consideration under
the Caribbean Basin Initiative are Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda, the Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Costa Rica, Dominica, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Grenada,
Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras,Jamaica, Nicaragua, Panama, Saint Lucia, Saint
Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, the Cayman Islands,
Montserrat, Netherlands Antilles, Saint Christopher-Nevis, Turks and Caicos Islands,
and the British Virgin Islands. Id.
144. Id. §§ 2701-2706 (1988); see Lunger, supra note 87, at 741.
145. 19 U.S.C. §§ 2702(b) (1988). The Caribbean Basin Initiative defines a
"beneficiary country" as any country listed in subsection (b) that has been designated
a beneficiary country in a presidential proclamation. 19 U.S.C. § 2702(a)(1)(A)
(1988); see Foote, supra note 141, at 267 (discussing concept of "beneficiary country").
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may not designate a country as a "beneficiary country" if such
country violates U.S. copyrights. 146 Second, in determining
whether a Caribbean country should be chosen as a beneficiary
country, the U.S. President must consider the extent to which
that country provides "adequate and effective" protection
under its laws as to copyrights. 47 U.S. copyright laws provide
the standards from which the U.S. President determines
whether the protection afforded under domestic Caribbean
copyright laws are "adequate and effective." 148
C. Multilateral Trade-Based Agreements
By the early 1980s, confronted with increasing copyright
infringement and ineffective solutions to that infringement, the
United States began to look for a multilateral trade-based resolution to the copyright piracy problem. The United States and
other developed countries categorize the lack of international
copyright protection as a trade issue with defined economic ef49
fects.'

Within this context, the United States considered the

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GAT-T")150 the in146. Section 2702(b) states in relevant part that "the President shall not designate any country a beneficiary country... if such country... has seized ownership or
control of property owned by a United States citizen ...[or] has taken steps to
repudiate or nullify ...any patent, trademark, or other intellectual property of a
United States citizen." 19 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(2)(A), (B)(ii) (1988). The President may
waive any of the criteria in section (b) only upon special circumstances. 19 U.S.C.
§ 2702(b)(2)(C) (1988). Requests for waivers are uncommon. Id.; see Hills, supra
note 142; see also Foote, supra note 141, at 268-70 (discussing "beneficiary countries").
147. Section 2702(c) reads, in pertinent part, that "[iun determining whether to
designate any country a beneficiary country ... the President shall take into account
...the extent to which the country provides under its law adequate and effective
means for foreign nationals to secure, exercise and enforce exclusive rights in intellectual property, including patent, trademark, and copyright rights." 19 U.S.C.
§ 2702(c)(9) (1988). Ten other factors are also taken into consideration. Id.
§ 2702(c)(l)-(11) (1988).
148. See Leaffer, supra note 7, at 304 ("The standards proposed by the United
States are unsurprisingly much like the U.S. law of trademark, patent, and copyright."); see supra notes 14-36 and accompanying text (outlining U.S. copyright law).
149. Peter Gakunu, Intellectual Property: Perspective of the Developing World, 19 GA.J.

& COMp. L. 358, 359 (1989) (observing that in contrast to U.S. view, developing
countries strongly believe that intellectual property negotiations are beyond scope of
trade agreements). There is great disagreement as to whether the problems arising
from international copyright law qualify as a trade issue. Id.; see supra notes 108-10
and accompanying text (discussing respective U.S. and Caribbean view on issue).
150. Opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. (pts. 5 & 6) A3, 55 U.N.T.S.
187 (1947) [hereinafter GATT].
INT'L
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ternational institution most adept to render the needed relief.
Today, developed nations prefer the GATT option to protect
5
international intellectual property rights.i '
GATT arose from the realization that one of the principal
causes of the Great Depression was shrinking world trade resulting from protectionism. 52 To avoid a repetition of the
Great Depression, the Western democracies committed themselves to trade liberalization after World War 11.153 In 1947,
twenty-four countries signed GATT, which liberalized some
trade immediately and established mechanisms for future trade
barrier removal. 1 54 Today, 105 countries are members of

GATT. 155
GATT strives to provide certainty and predictability in the
world market trade conditions. 1 56 The foremost principle embodied in GATT is the concept of "Most Favored Nation" status.' 5 7 The term is deceptive, because it implies that some na151. Stanback, supra note 52, at 523 (discussing developed nations' preference
of GATT option); see ROBERT P. BENKO, PROTECTING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
RIGHTS: ISSUES AND CONTROVERSIES 27 (1987) ("There is a movement in the United

States to make the GATF the focal point for enforcement powers and means of settling disputes."). Developing nations believe WIPO, not GATT, is the adequate forum for discussing international copyrights. See infra text accompanying notes 22026 (discussing in further detail divergent views of developing nations vis-i-vis U.S.
view in relation to GATT and WIPO roles).
152. Johnson, supra note 109, at 85. Protectionism results from interference
with international free trade designed to protect domestic industry. Id. Protectionism, or "safeguards," can take the form of quotas, tariffs, and voluntary restraint
agreements. See generally ALAN C. SWAN &JOHN F. MURPHY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
THE REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS

(1991) 349-

514 (discussing safeguards and unfair practices).
153. See GAT', supra note 150, pmbl., 61 Stat. pt. (5) at A 1l,55 U.N.T.S. at
196. GATT is "directed to the substantial reduction of tariffs and other barriers to
trade and to the elimination of discriminatory treatment in international commerce."
Id.
154. Id. at A3 n.l, 55 U.N.T.S. at 194.
155. See SWAN & MURPHY supra note 152, at 219 (observing that in addition to

105 GATT members, "more than twenty other nations apply the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade to their trade relations of [sic] a defacto basis").
156. Leaffer, supra note 7, at 298. GATT is the only multilateral instrument that
lays down agreed upon rules for the conduct of international trade. Id. Also, it is a
medium for negotiations. Id.
157. Johnson, supra note 109, at 85-86. Article I of GATT makes the commitment to the principle of the Most Favored Nation [hereinafter MFN], whereby contracting parties must give unqualified MFN treatment to the products of other countries. GATT, supra note 150, art. I, 61 Stat. pt. (5) at A12, 55 U.N.T.S. at 196. Any
privilege given by one country to a product imported from another country must be
immediately granted to like products of any contracting party. Id.; see generally KEN-
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tions receive special privileges over others.15 8 Quite the contrary, "Most Favored Nation" status provides that every
contracting party receives the same trade treatment as that
given to the Most Favored Nation.' 9 Each member nation
agrees to give equal access to its markets, without discrimination, to all its trading partners. 6 ' If barriers are lowered for
one country, those barriers are automatically reduced for all
parties. 161

The most recent round of GATT negotiations, the Uruguay Round, 62 includes intellectual property for the first
time.'16 Previously, GATT considered intellectual property
only tangentially.' 6' Because the United States believes that
R. SIMMONDS & BRIAN H. W. HILL, LAW AND PRACTICE UNDER THE GATF
(1988) (providing overview of GATT provisions and application of provisions to
practice); Leaffer, supra note 7, at 299. Other basic principles upon which GATT is
based are the following: (1) the national treatment principle, whereby contracting
parties may not inflict more onerous taxes or regulations on imported products than
on like domestic products; (2) the tariff concession principle, by which contracting
parties must maintain customs duties on imported products at levels not more than
those specified in the latest applicable schedules that the party has filed; (3) the principle against nontariff barriers, whereby contracting parties cannot use quantitative
and other nontariff barriers to restrain trade; and (4) the fair trade principle, by
which contracting parties cannot promote exports through subsidies or dumping and
may defend its domestic industry from unfair practices only through reasonable and
proportionate tariff measures. Leaffer, supra note 7, at 299.
158. Johnson, supra note 109, at 87.
159. Id
160. Id.
161. Id.; see C. Michael Aho, More Bilateral Trade Agreements Would be a Blunder:
What the New President Should Do, 22 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 27 (1989). Article I of GATT
states in relevant part that "any advantage, favour, privilege, or immunity granted by
any Contracting Party to any product originating in or destined for any other country
shall be accorded immediately and unconditionally to the like product originating in
or destined for the territories of all other contracting parties." GATT, supra note
150, art. I, 61 Stat. pt. (5) at A12, 55 U.N.T.S. at 196.
162. Johnson, supra note 109, at 86. The Uruguay Round is the latest round of
GATT negotiations. Id. Since 1947 there have been seven completed rounds of
GATT negotiations: the Geneva Round of 1947, the Annecy, France Round of 1949,
the Torquay, France Round of 1951, the Geneva Round of 1956, the Dillon Round of
1960-1962, the Kennedy Round of 1963-1967 and the Tokyo Round of 1973-1979.
Id. The Uruguay Round, launched in 1986, has two very broad goals. Id. The first is
to prevent increased protectionist pressures from adversely affecting the multilateral
trading system. Id. The second is to extend GATT to disputed areas that have not
been included in previous GATT rounds. Id.
163. Anthony McDermott, Ambitious GATT Round, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 14, 1991, at
26 (discussing goals for latest GATT Round).
164. GATT,supra note 150, art. IX, 61 Stat. pt. (5) at A29, 55 U.N.T.S. at 220.
Article IX established that marks of origin should not be used to hinder world trade.
NETH
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other approaches to the international copyright problem do
not sufficiently respond to its interests, the United States was
the foremost advocate of extending GATT's global trade laws
to include the protection of copyrights. 6 - Developing coun-

tries, however, have opposed such an extension strongly, arguing that GATT is an improper forum to address the prob66
lem. 1
The current GATT proposal is called Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property ("TRIPS"). 67 TRIPS would integrate minimum world standards for the protection of intellectual property into GATT.'16 In addition, TRIPS attempts to
clarify existing GATT rules bearing upon intellectual property
protection and to elaborate new rules as appropriate in reachId. Article XX(d) placed copyrights, trademarks and patents among the exceptions to
GATT liberalization. Id. art. XX(d), 61 Stat. pt. (5) at A61, 55 U.N.T.S. at 262; see
SIMMONDS & HILL, supra note 157, at 19-20, 53 (discussing intellectual property provisions in recent GATT negotiations).
165. Kunz-Hallstein, supra note 126, at 267; see Keith M. Rockwell, U.S. Strategy
Shift Pays Dividends in GA TT Talks, J. COM., August 2, 1991 at IA; Damschroder, supra
note 29, at 385 (observing that "it is the prospect of effective enforcement that has
drawn the public and private sectors in the United States to the GATIT"); Harvey J.
Winter, The Role of the United States Government in Improving InternationalIntellectual Property Protection, J. L. & TECH. 325, 326; see generally U.S. ProposalforNegotiations on TradeRelated Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, 34 Pat. Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA)

667 (1987).
166. See supra notes 108-10 and accompanying text and infra notes 220-26 and
accompanying text (discussing divergent U.S. and Caribbean views on whether
GATT is proper forum to address international copyright issues).
167. A. Jane Bradley, Intellectual Property Rights, Investment, and Trade in Services in
the Uruguay Round: Laying the Foundations, 23 STAN. J. INT'L L. 57, 59 (1987). "Trade

Related Aspects of Intellectual Property" [hereinafter TRIPS] is being negotiated for
inclusion in the Uruguay Round of GATT. Id. If adopted, TRIPS would include
minimum world standards for the protection of intellectual property as a part of
GATT. Id.
168. Leaffer, supra note 7, at 277; see Bradley, supra note 167, at 59. The Punta
del Este Minesterial Declaration outlines as follows the Uruguay Round objectives in
relation to intellectual property:
In order to reduce the distortions and impediments to international trade,
and taking into account the need to promote effective and adequate protection of intellectual property rights, and to ensure that measures and procedures to enforce intellectual property rights do not themselves become barriers to legitimate trade, the negotiations shall aim to clarify GATT provisions and elaborate as appropriate new rules and disciplines. Negotiations
shall aim to develop a multilateral framework of principles, rules and disciplines dealing with international trade in counterfeit goods, taking into account work already undertaken in GATT.
Id. at 58-59.
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ing adequate and effective intellectual property rights protec16 9
tion and enforcement.

U.S. objectives 70 for the Uruguay Round include member
nation recognition of the need for intellectual property protection and the promulgation of standards for the effective enforcement of rights established in substantive copyright
laws. 7' The enforcement aspect of the proposal includes enhanced implementation of border ordinances devised to catch
infringing goods before they reach the country's markets, as
7 2
well as increased international surveillance and notification.
The United States has succeeded in getting intellectual property rights on the Uruguay Round bargaining table, but much
work remains to be done.
III. A REGIONAL TRADE-BASED APPROACH PROVIDES
THE BEST APPROACH TO INTERNATIONAL
COPYRIGHT PROTECTION
In the search for an integrated solution to the U.S.-Caribbean controversy on the enforcement of international copyright laws, the insertion of a TRIPS-like provision into a regional trade-based approach offers a mutually beneficial workable answer. Such an approach would lead to an effective
resolution because it more fully addresses the needs of both
positions and provides both sides with benefits.
A. Current Approaches Fail to Provide an Adequate Solution
Copyright owners have looked to various differing international law approaches such as multilateral copyright conventions and bilateral treaties and multinational agreements to
protect their creations. 73 Although each approach has
marked advantages and disadvantages, the disadvantages tend
169. JanJancinJr., Uruguay Round: Implicationsof the TRIPS Negotiations, 29 INT'L
(N.Y. State Bar Assn, New York, N.Y.), Feb. 22,
1991, at 30.
170. See U.S. Framework Proposal to GATT Concerning Intellectual Property Rights, 4
Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1372 (Nov. 4, 1987) (discussing U.S. proposal concerning
GATT's coverage of intellectual property).
171. Id. For a discussion of the proposals of the European Community and Japan, see Damschroder, supra note 29, at 397.
172. Damschroder, supra note 29, at 394.
173. See supra notes 111-72 and accompanying text (discussing various international approaches to copyright protection).
ASPECTS OF INTELLECTUAL PROP.
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to outweigh the advantages. The traditional methods have
proven ineffective due to their failure to accommodate the differing objectives and interests of both the Caribbean countries
and the United States.' 7 4
1. Effectiveness of Multilateral Copyright Treaties
Multinational copyright treaties, such as the Berne Convention and the UCC, undoubtedly accomplish very useful
functions in the area of international intellectual property protection.' 75 The conventions provide a concrete body of international copyright laws. In addition, the standards embraced
by such copyright laws, with which the signatories are expected
to comply, are standards approved by the international community. 176 Furthermore, nations generally comply with international copyright treaties because, as a matter of international
law, the treaties legally bind all of the nations that have ratified
77
them.
Despite these advantages, serious obstacles face those relying on multilateral copyright conventions as the means to
protect their property. The main hindrance stems from the
treaties' lack of enforcement power as to laws outlined by the
multilateral copyright conventions. 78 The United States argues that, due to the lack of enforcement mechanisms, a nation
can violate its obligations conspicuously under such a multilateral treaty, without fear of legal sanctions. 79 In addition to
this problem, the conventions include no dispute settlement
provisions. 8 0 If a conflict arises under the treaties administered by the WIPO, the claimant has no recourse but to take
174. See supra notes 111-72 and accompanying text (discussing traditional international methods used to protect copyrighted materials).
175. See supra notes 111-33 and accompanying text (describing Berne Convention and UCC).
176. See supra notes 154-55 and accompanying text (discussing GATT standards
and approval of such standards, as evidenced by great number of signatories).
177. Vienna Convention, supra note 81, arts. 26-27, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 339. Despite the binding nature of international treaties, some commentators argue that international conventions merely influence the content of intellectual property laws
and that such laws are substantively decided by the laws of each nation. Sherman &
Korn, supra note 115 at 6.
178. Leaffer, supra note 7, at 275-76.
179. Id. at 300.
180. Id. at 301.
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The
the dispute before the International Court of Justice.'
rereluctance
world's
developing
with
the
WIPO sympathizes
8 2
Therefore, modifigarding intellectual property protection.'
cation of the lack of enforcement mechanisms and inadequate
dispute resolution found in multilateral copyright treaties is
unlikely. The consensus is that multilateral copyright convenlarge-scale
tions have not proven effective against methodical,
83
copyright infringement in developing countries.'
2. Effectiveness of Bilateral Trade-Based Copyright
Approaches
In the search for a resolution to the problem of international copyright protection, bilateral trade-based agreements
have several marked advantages. Because only two parties are
involved, negotiations are expeditious and results occur in a
relatively short amount of time.'8 4 Bilateral negotiations also
allow the parties to address issues specific to them, resulting in
an agreement which actually responds to the divergent interests and objectives of both sides.' 8 5 The typical deadlock
often reached in multilateral forums, and usually concerning
issues irrelevant to the parties concerned, can thus be
avoided.' 86 In addition, from a U.S. point of view, bilateral
trade-based agreements prove effective in that the United
States can place direct pressure on noncompliant countries to
remedy their copyright laws, thus ensuring their enforce181. Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 1, 1
U.N.T.S. xvii, 59 Stat. 1055 [hereinafter ICJ Statute]. Article 1 of the ICJ Statute
states that the International Court ofJustice is established by the United Nations as
the principal judicial organ of the United Nations. Id. Article 35 states that the International Court of Justice is open to all states parties to the present ICJ Statute. Id.
art. 35. The International Court ofJustice has jurisdiction to issue advisory opinions
on any legal question at the request of any party authorized by the General Assembly.
Id. art. 65.
182. WILLIAMS, supra note 113, at 78. The developing countries constitute the
majority in many of the specialized agencies, outweighing the views of and the votes
of developed countries. Id.
183. Leaffer, supra note 7, at 276.
184. Baucus, supra note 134, at 7-8. For example, the bilateral free-trade negotiations recently concluded with Canada took sixteen months as opposed to the last
GATT round which took six years. Id.; see supra notes 134- 48 and accompanying text
(discussing bilateral trade-based copyright treaties).
185. Id. (noting that bilateral forum allows parties to discuss broader, as well as
more detailed issues likely to be beyond scope of multilateral treaties such as GATT).
186. Id.
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87

The latter advantage, the ability to coerce a noncomplying
country to conform, may also be a disadvantage. A U.S. attempt to force a Caribbean country to comply with interna-

tional law may backfire and lead to resentment; it may also
seem like colonialism. 8 8 From the standpoint of Caribbean
countries, the approach of the Caribbean Basin Initiative contains several grounds for resentment. 8 9 First, the Initiative
was motivated primarily by political and social unrest resulting
from economic hardship in Central America. 90 Caribbean
countries therefore believed that economic benefits were
granted merely to develop friendly governments in a region
strategically vital to the international political agenda of the
United States.' 9 ' Second, disaffection grew from U.S. demands that the country in question strive for economic development in accordance with U.S.-designated methods. 9 '
Third, the country had to agree with U.S. policy in the region
as a prerequisite to receiving benefits. '93 Fourth, the Initiative
inevitably creates fragmentation of the Caribbean countries by
positioning them in competition with each other for beneficiary country status, and further resentment toward the United
187. See supra notes 134-40 and accompanying text (discussing advantages of
bilateral agreements from U.S. standpoint).
188. See Primo Braga, supra note 79, at 264 ("[U]nilateral actions designed to
force [lesser developed countries] to reform their intellectual property systems may
easily backfire .... ").
189. See Raleigh, supra note 88, at 136 (noting that U.S. considered the development of friendly governments in Caribbean necessary to avoid adverse effects on U.S.
interests).
190. Id. (stating that "[e]conomic crises caused by the high price of imported oil
and declining prices for major export products . . . threatened the social stability of
countries in the Caribbean Region and, therefore, began to have direct adverse consequences to the US in the form of massive illegal immigration and perceived Communist infiltration").
191. Id.
192. See Abraham F. Lowenthal, Misplaced Emphasis, 47 FOR. POL. 114, 115
(1982) (observing that "the [Initiative] reflects the administration's interest in military security, political loyalty, and advantages for U.S. firms, rather than U.S. concern
for the region's long-term development. Because most Caribbean countries are dependent on the United States, they will speak the language [it] wants to hear").
193. See Baker & Toro-Monserrate, supra note 86, at 12 (stating that "one of the
dangers inherent in the policy is illustrated by the invasion of Grenada, over which
[Caribbean] nations were divided in their support of U.S. action. Shortly after the
invasion, the U.S. punished Trinidad and Tobago, the most outspoken critic of the
action, by cancelling several trade agreements").
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States is created by the "carrot and stick" use of trade benefit
promises in return for copyright protection.' 9 4
In addition, the United States has much greater bargaining power when negotiating a bilateral agreement with only
one Caribbean nation at a time. 195 Hence, it is likely that the
resulting agreement will be biased in favor of the United States
and will impose U.S. standards.' 9 6 Bilateral agreements tend
to fragment the international trading system, forcing countries
to compete against each other for agreements with the United
States. 97 The overall result is resentment and distrust among
the Caribbean nations and against the United States. Because
of the difficulty of securing worldwide copyright protection
through bilateral approaches, they have been overshadowed by
multilateral and regional conventions. 9 '
3. Effectiveness of Multilateral Trade-Based Approach
Advocates of GATT as the solution to the international
copyright problem often mention GATT's dispute settlement
mechanism as a principal benefit that other approaches lack. '99
Once a disagreement arises over any trade issues covered by
194. See Leaffer, supra note 7, at 295 (stating that "former noncomplying countries receive the right to export to the United States as a most favored nation in
exchange for providing proper intellectual property protection").
195. See supra notes 134-40 and accompanying text (observing that United
States unilaterally decides whether a country will receive U.S. beneficial treatment in
relation to trade, and noting U.S. ability to impose trade sanctions if displeased with
Caribbean intellectual property law enforcement).
196. See supra notes 141-48 and accompanying text (discussing procedure for
ratification of U.S.-Caribbean bilateral trade-based treaties and showing U.S. control
over crucial aspects of procedure).
197. See generally Aho, supra note 161, at 25 (discussing effect of bilateral treaties).
198. UNESCO, COPYRIGHT, supra note 5, at 63.
199. See Leaffer, supra note 7, at 300; Morford, supra note 2, at 339 ("[C]urrent
international intellectual property agreements do not include dispute settlement provisions other than a provision to take disputes ... to the International Court ofJustice. The GATT offers . . . effective dispute settlement mechanisms to intellectual
property issues.").
Dispute settlement provisions are found in Articles XXII and XXIII of GATT.
GATT, supra note 150, arts. XXII-XXIII, 61 Stat. pt. (5) at A64-65, 55 U.N.T.S. at
266-68. Article XXII provides than any contracting party will consult with any other
contracting party with respect to any matter affecting the operation of the GATT. Id.
Article XXIII provides that GATT contracting parties may suspend the obligation
toward the contracting party that has caused impairment or nullification. Id.
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GATT, the aggrieved party files a complaint.2 0 0 A third-party
panel of experts investigates the claim, and reaches a conclusion as to the dispute. 20 ' The panel reports its conclusions and
recommendations to all contracting parties.20 2 The contracting parties decide on the matter, and often follow the
panel recommendations. 20 3 GATT also provides a forum for
negotiations.
The GATF option thereby offers legally binding obligations as opposed to suggestive norms. 0 4 Under GATT, unlike
the Berne Convention and the UCC, 20 5 a signatory country
cannot disregard its obligations openly without the worry of
sanctions imposed by the treaty mechanism. 20 6 The state of an
offended copyright owner can threaten the noncomplying state
with the imposition of the GATF dispute settlement provisions
which, if ignored, can lead to trade sanctions.20 7 Proponents
of the GAT solution identify among its advantages the legitimacy and comprehensiveness that is granted to international
copyright law through GATT. 20 8 GATT's legitimacy as a
source of international law is enhanced by its vast number of
signatories.20 9 Its large membership implies the consensus of
many nations as to its provisions. 2 10 Also, GATT is the only
multinational organization that outlines agreed upon provisions for the conduct of international trade, and that has a sub200. GATT, supra note 150, arts. XXII-XXIII, 61 Stat. pt. (5) at A64-65, 55
U.N.T.S. at 266-68 (discussing GATT dispute settlement provisions).
201. See Leaffer, supra note 7, at 301. The members of the third party panel act
not as representatives of their respective governments, but in their individual capacities. Id.

202. Id.
203. Id.; see Damschroder, supra note 29, at 384 (discussing GATT's dispute settlement procedure).
204. Stanback, supra note 52, at 531 n.66.
205. See supra notes 111-33 and accompanying text (discussing Berne Convention and UCC).
206. Leaffer, supra note 7, at 301 (observing that a country cannot disregard its
obligations without consequences).
207. See Stanback, supra note 52, at 549 (regarding use of dispute mechanism as
leverage).
208. See Leaffer, supra note 7, at 298 (stating that GATT is most important international agreement regulating trade among nations).
209. Id. (noting that GATT's membership represents more than four-fifths of
world trade).
210. Id.
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stantial record in promoting the goals of free trade. 2 11
There are, however, disadvantages to the GAIT option
that ultimately outweigh its benefits. The Uruguay Round of
GATT itself, let alone the proposed TRIPS provision within it,
has suffered a grave series of stalemates. 2 In its sixth year of
negotiations, the Uruguay Round has been a journey of starts,
stops, deadlocks, and inactivity leading to fatigue, boredom,
and frustration. 2 3 The deadlocks relate principally to agricultural issues, with much of the blame placed on the uncompromising positions of the European Community and the United
States.21 4 In addition, the United States itself faces recessionbased pressures raising national and protectionist issues above
the global concerns of the Uruguay Round.2 15
The Uruguay Round negotiators have divided their attention among numerous and extremely complicated issues. 16
Intellectual property has been overshadowed by complex matters such as liberalization of agricultural policies and trade in
services. 217 Some commentators criticize GAIT as too fragile
a forum for such ambitious negotiations. 218 However, for a
more effective GATT, states would have to cede some sovereign rights to GAIT, 2 9 an extremely unlikely event.
211.
GATT is
tions).
212.
213.
214.

Id.; see supra note 156 and accompanying text (observing that objective of
to provide certainty and predictability in world market and trade condi-

McDermott, supra note 163, at 26.
Id.
Id.; see SWAN & MURPHY, supra note 152, at 320. They note the following:
[T]he United States and the [European Community] . . . appear at this late
date in the negotiations to be at an impasse on the rate of subsidy reduction
... [T]he United States initially proposed a definite deadline for the elimination of all domestic agricultural subsidies by the industrialized countries
.
Hence the present impasse; how [much] reduction and how fast.

Id.
215. See SWAN & MURPHY, supra note 152, at 320.
216. Leaffer, supra note 7, at 299 n.131.
217. Id.
218. McDermott, supra note 163, at 26. GATT is a small organization with a full
staff of four hundred people but it does not have the authority or the standing of a
U.N. organization. Id. As a result, the future of GArT itself has been under scrutiny.
Id. Even if the Uruguay Round is successful, the multilateral trading system will have
to be enforced institutionally. Id.
219. Leaffer, supra note 7, at 302. Any agreement in GATT would likely force
most signatories to change their national laws. Id. For example, some proposals
would require patents to be granted on a "first-to-file" basis, rather than the "first-toinvent" criteria used by the United States. Sherman & Korn, supra note 115, at 25.
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The strongly held view of developing countries that intellectual property negotiations and global criteria are beyond
the scope of GATT presents a significant handicap for GATT's
effectiveness.220 These countries did not want to negotiate
over TRIPS at the Uruguay Round because they do not consider intellectual property a trade-related issue. 2 2 ' Developing
countries agree that the WIPO, not GATT, is the correct forum for international copyright negotiations.2 2 2 Developing
countries consider GATT's duplication of initiatives already
covered by the WIPO-administered international copyright
treaties 223 to be inappropriate. 224 These countries consider it
improper that GATT requires developing countries to adopt
new rules inconsistent with their national development interests. 2225 In light of the developing countries' formidable reluctance to include intellectual property in GATT,the challenge
of legitimizing inclusion of copyright issues into GATF is likely
to continue to plague the United States throughout the Uruguay Round and future rounds of GATF, if the United States
continues to depend on GATT to provide the solution to international copyright protection. 2 6
A further important flaw in the GATT solution relates to
the widely differing interests and objectives of the United
States in relation to Caribbean countries. 227 These contrasts
lead to a discrepancy as to what the TRIPS standards for inter220. Gakunu, supra note 149, at 359.
221. See supra notes 108-10 and accompanying text (describing Caribbean perspective as to international copyright law).
222. See Damschroder, supra note 29, at 384; EC andJapan PresentIntellectual Property Proposalsfor Uruguay Round Negotiations, 4 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1499, 1499 (Dec.

2, 1987) ("Third World countries have argued that the WIPO ...should be the
forum for such discussions, and that GATF should concentrate on trade in goods
and services."); Gakunu, supra note 149, at 359; Stanback, supra note 52, at 524, 53233.
223. See supra notes 111-33 and accompanying text (describing international
copyright treaties administered by WIPO).
224. See supra notes 108-10 and accompanying text (discussing perspective of
Caribbean countries in relation to international copyright laws and treaties).
225. Gakunu, supra note 149, at 359.
226. Damschroder, supra note 29, at 393 n. 160 (observing that even domestically there exists controversy as to the appropriateness of using GAFF to solve international intellectual property problems).
227. See Baucus, supra note 134, at 6; see also Gakunu, supra note 149, at 364
(discussing U.S.-Caribbean differing interests).
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national copyright protection should be.228 It has been repeatedly advanced that the goal of the United States is to mold international intellectual property law to conform to U.S. laws
and standards despite the differing circumstances in individual
countries. 229 The United States unrealistically and rigidly denies differential treatment for certain developing countries.2 °
As a consequence, a TRIPS provision will inevitably lead to
enduring conflicts of opinion as to what constitutes "adequate" copyright protection. It is noteworthy, however, that
the United States no longer has the unquestioned economic
dominance needed to dictate that the rest of the world play
according to its rules.23 '
Even if none of the above-described hardships existed,
GATT needs substantial reform. 23 2 The much-hailed dispute
settlement mechanism is admittedly ineffective and inefficient,
with GATT cases claiming notoriety for endless hearings and
severe politicalization by member nations.23 3 Furthermore,
the people responsible for the GATT dispute mechanism simply lack the expertise in international intellectual property necessary to make informed decisions.234
GATT's large membership, the same feature that affords
GATE its comprehensiveness and legitimacy, has also caused
progress within the institution to slow to a crawl. 35 The Uru228. See Gakunu, supra note 149, at 364 ("It is... not in the interest of developing countries to fashion their intellectual property laws on the basis of criteria...
derived from the conditions and interests of the technologically advanced countries."); Leaffer, supra note 7, at 304-05 ("The standards proposed by the United
States are unsurprisingly much like the U.S. law of trademark, patent, and copyright."); Stanback, supra note 52, at 530-31 ("Not surprisingly, the norms proposed
[by the U.S.] resemble present U.S. law.").
229. Primo Braga, supra note 79, at 252 (noting "the widespread perception that
the United States is trying to translate its domestic provisions into international standards").
230. Leafier, supra note 7, at 306.
231. Baucus, supra note 134, at 7.
232. See Damschroder, supra note 29, at 390 ("Both developed and developing
nations are now looking to a major revision of the GATT as the only solution to the
deterioration of international trade.").
233. Leaffer, supra note 7, at 301; see Johnson, supra note 109, at 92.
234. Stanback, supra note 52, at 550 (concluding that "GATT does not appear
to be the most appropriate forum in light of the unique characteristics of intellectual
property").
235. See supra notes 154-55 and accompanying text (discussing effect of GATT's
large membership).
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guay Round has stalled repeatedly on issues completely irrelevant to the international copyright problem between the
United States and the Caribbean countries. 2 36 Furthermore,
because any intellectual property provisions will have to satisfy
the majority of member nations, 2 37 an effective agreement on
any issue or dispute will evolve over a long period of time, if it
develops at all. 238 This situation is inadequate for those, such
as U.S. industry, requiring immediate results. In light of the
considerable hardships connected with a GAT solution to the
international copyright dilemma, it is evident that the disadvantages outweigh the advantages.
B. The Regional Trade-BasedApproach Provides the Best Solution
In the search for an integrated solution to the U.S.-Caribbean controversy on the enforcement of international copyright laws, the insertion of a TRIPS-like provision into a regional trade-based approach offers a workable answer. Countries in a particular region often have comparable needs and
may therefore benefit from establishing a regional agreement
on copyrights. 2 9 Also, a regional approach would lead to an
effective resolution because it more fully addresses the needs
of both the Caribbean and U.S. positions and provides for mutual gain.
A regional-trade based agreement, including a TRIPS-like
provision, could be accomplished through the use of the Caribbean Community ("CARICOM") 24 ° and former President
236. See supra notes 216-19 and accompanying text (observing that Uruguay
Round talks on intellectual property have been overshadowed by complex matters
such as liberalization of agricultural policies and trade in services).
237. Damschroder, supra note 29, at 372.
238. Leaffer, supra note 7, at 307; see McDermott, supra note 163, at 26.
239. See supra notes 78-100 and accompanying text (discussing Caribbean perspective regarding international copyright laws and treaties).
240. See CARICOM, supra note 58, 946 U.N.T.S. 17. (discussing membership
and genesis of CARICOM). CARICOM replaced the failed Caribbean Free Trade
Association, Dec. 15, 1965, 772 U.N.T.S. 2 [hereinafter CARIFTA] agreement which
was formed by four Caribbean nations in 1968. See C. Ray Miskelley, GrandAnse Declaration: Can the Caribbean Community Realistically Integrate IntraregionalTrade and Production Within the Confines of the CARICOM Treaty by 1993?, 20 GA.J. INT'L & COMp. L. 185
(1990). CARIFTA failed due to the objections to the disparity of the relative benefits
created by the operation of the agreement between the lesser developed countries
and the more developed countries within it. Id. at 190; see Baker & Toro-Monserrate,
supra note 86 (providing discussion of relationship between Caribbean Basin Initiative and CARICOM).

1992-1993]

U.S.-CARIBBEAN COPYRIGHTS

George Bush's Enterprise for the Americas Initiative
("EAI").2 4 The United States signed a framework EAI agreement with CARICOM in July of 1991, which included, among
other goals, a statement of agreed-upon principles regarding
the benefits of open trade and investment and the need for
adequate intellectual property rights. 24 2 The agreement established a U.S.-CARICOM Trade and Investment Council,
thereby providing a framework for a concrete process of consultation and negotiations in signing future treaties. 43 Unlike
the Caribbean Basin Initiative, the EAI is a "two-way street"
244
designed to benefit both sides in reaching a final agreement.
A TRIPS-like provision complements CARICOM. CARICOM has among its objectives the advancement of social, cultural, and technological development. 24 5 The infrastructure

necessary to reach a U.S.-CARICOM agreement, including the
TRIPS-like provision, is already present within CARICOM.
The internal structure of the CARICOM treaty is composed of
two elements, the Caribbean Community and the Common
Market. The Caribbean Community particulars are articulated
in the body of the CARICOM treaty, while the Common Market provisions are contained in the annex to the CARICOM
treaty. 2 46 The Caribbean Community branch of CARICOM

has "full juridical personality" and "may enter into agreements
with Member States, non-Member States and international or241. EAI, supra note 141, at 1011; see Carrie B. Clark, The Enterpriseforthe Americas Initiative: Supporting a "Silent Revolution" in Latin America, Bus. AM., Sept. 23, 1991,
at 6. The Bush Administration launched the Enterprise for the Americas Initiative on
June 27, 1990. Id. The EAI's goal is to strengthen Caribbean and Latin American
economies by means of greater trade, investment and reduction of official debt owed
to the United States. Id. The long-term goal is an eventual hemispheric free trade
area. Id.
242. Clark, supra note 241, at 6.
243. Caricom-US Agreement Paves Way for "Dynamic" and "Growth-Inducing" Ties,
LATIN AM. NEWSL., Aug. 29, 1991, at 1.

244. Id.
245. CARICOM, supra note 58, art. 4, 946 U.N.T.S. at 19. CARICOM also
designates as its goals the economic integration of the Caribbean Basin and the coordination and regulation of trade among member states. Id.; see Miskelley, supra note
240, at 190. CARICOM's goals address the long standing problems of the region
arising from the existence of many small countries, many of which have only recently
achieved economic independence. Baker & Toro-Monserrate, supra note 86, at 2.
246. See Miskelley, supra note 240, at 191; Baker & Toro-Monserrate, supra note
86, at 3.
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ganisations "247 through the Heads of Government Conference. 4 CARICOM therefore provides a viable forum and infrastructure through which Caribbean nations can negotiate
collectively with the United States as to international intellectual property.
The advantages of using CARICOM and the EAI as a
framework for reaching a regional trade-based agreement containing a TRIPS-like provision are manifold. The traditional
approaches previously mentioned have proven deficient as
they do not sufficiently promote mutual gain. 24 9 Resulting
agreements tend to be unduly biased in favor of one party or
the other. 250 The multilateral copyright conventions, for example, tend to favor the developing nations, thus the United
States finds them inefficient. 25 ' On the other hand, bilateral
treaties reached with the United States through the Caribbean
Basin Initiative favor the United States, causing resentment
and noncompliance in Caribbean countries.2 2 Through a regional trade-based agreement, the Caribbean nations, as a
group, would hold more bargaining power with the United
States, resulting in an agreement which would more equitably
represent the interests of both sides.
A regional copyright treaty would provide Caribbean nations and the United States with a degree of specificity in their
agreement not possible with large multilateral institutions and
treaties such as GATT. The unique circumstances and interests particular to Caribbean nations, such as their desperate
need for intellectual property for development purposes, cou247. CARICOM, supra note 58, art. 20, 946 U.N.T.S. at 25.
248. Baker & Toro-Monserrate, supra note 86, at 3 n.9. Article 8 of the CARICOM treaty states that the Heads of Government Conference shall be the final authority for the conclusion of treaties on behalf of the CARICOM Caribbean Community. CARICOM, supra note 58, 946 U.N.T.S. at 21; see Miskelley, supra note 240, at
191 (stating that "the Heads of Government Conference possesses the authority to
enter into agreements with states and international organizations").
249. See supra notes 111-72 and accompanying text (outlining traditional methods used to protect intellectual property on an international scale).
250. See supra notes 174-238 and accompanying text (discussing advantages and
disadvantages of traditional methods of protecting intellectual property on an international scale).
251. See supra notes 111-33 and accompanying text (providing discussion of international copyright conventions).
252. See supra notes 134-48 and accompanying text (discussing bilateral treaties
and Caribbean Basin Initiative).
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pled with their limited ability to pay for it, would be more adequately addressed in a smaller forum comprised mostly of
other nations with similar problems. Likewise, the United
States' need to ensure compensation for the intellectual property of its copyright owners would also receive its deserved attention. 5 3
A regional agreement would be genuinely flexible, allowing discussion of specific issues beyond the scope of large
multilateral treaties. For example, the Caribbean nations
could negotiate with the United States regarding their desire
for the application of a more realistic and lower standard of
international copyright laws. A TRIPS-like provision, accounting for both viewpoints on what constitutes "adequate" protection of international copyright laws, could thus be specifically molded. Furthermore, because fewer parties would be involved, negotiations and procedures within the treaty
framework would be more expeditious, thus meeting the
pressing needs of both sides within an acceptable timeframe. 254 This situation could be achieved without one of the
major drawbacks of the bilateral treaty approach to international copyrights, namely, the fragmentation of the international trading structure into a series of individual countries
that must compete with each other to reach a beneficial agreement with the United States.255
A regional trade-based approach to the international
copyright dilemma would also address the principal complaint
of the United States concerning inadequate enforcement of
those copyright laws presently in existence. Any treaty signed
between the United States and the Caribbean countries, including any TRIPS-like provisions contained therein, would legally bind all parties as a matter of international law, as do all
253. See supra notes 175-83 and accompanying text (discussing effectiveness of
multilateral treaties). Large multilateral institutions and treaties cannot achieve sufficient specificity to cover the particular interests of a country or region because their
vast membership includes countries of such contrasting economic, political, and socioeconomic situations. Resulting agreements must therefore patch over their differences and as a result are more general in nature.
254. See Baucus, supra note 134, at 7-8 (observing that "the old rule of thumb
that 'the fewer parties at the table the faster the negotiations' is particularly applicable in international trade negotiations").
255. See supra text and accompanying notes 184-98 (discussing effectiveness of
bilateral treaties).
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international treaties.2 5 6 Enforcement could be effected by the
inclusion of a dispute settlement mechanism similar to the one
contained in GATT.2 5 7 This mechanism would avoid the
problems of multilateral copyright conventions, by preventing
noncompliant countries from violating their obligations without the fear of sanctions within the treaty framework. The
United States could use the dispute settlement mechanism as
leverage in negotiations with an offending country, and if unsuccessful, could initiate the dispute settlement procedure.
Unlike the process provided for in the Caribbean Basin Initiative, however, the United States could not impose economic
sanctions unilaterally on a Caribbean nation outside the treaty
provisions.2 5 8
CONCLUSION
In the search for an integrated solution to the U.S.-Caribbean controversy for the enforcement of international copyright law, an adequate solution must be based upon mutual
gain. A successful solution must take into account the interests
and objectives of both parties, arising from the domestic legal,
political and socioeconomic situations found within the countries concerned. The implementation of a TRIPS-like provision into a regional trade-based approach offers the most adequate answer to the international copyright dilemma.
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256. Vienna Convention, supra note 81, art. 26, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 339.
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